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Brown: Brown: Confidentiality in Mediation:

COMMENT
CONFIDENTIALITY IN
MEDIATION: STATUS AND
IMPLICATIONS
I. INTRODUCTION
Mediation is becoming an increasingly popular alternative to formal
adjudication. Large mediation programs handling huge numbers of both civil and
criminal cases have sprung up in several of the largest cities in the nation. In
Tulsa, Oklahoma, when the police write a citation, they often write "mediation"
in place of a dollar amount.' The mediation program in Columbus, Ohio, handled
over 9,000 cases in a one year period.2 Of those 9,000 cases, 500 ultimately
resulted in criminal charges, 3 and twelve resulted in one of the disputants
murdering the other.4
As mediation becomes more widely used as an alternative to litigation, a new
problem has emerged which threatens its continued viability-Confidentiality. As
early as 1982, the ABA Special Committee on Dispute Resolution coined the term
"subpoena crisis" as a shorthand reference for the most persuasive topic of
conversation in the office-how to assist mediation program administrators in
resisting compelled disclosure of mediation records.' This crisis prompted many
programs to circumvent the problem by instructing their mediators to refrain from
writing anything down or to destroy their records as soon as the mediation was
concluded.6 Circumstances such as these raise serious questions concerning the
effect the "confidentiality crisis" will have on the future of mediation.
A review of the literature concerning confidentiality reveals an almost
universal agreement that confidentiality is necessary to the survival of mediation

1. SPECIAL COMM. ON DLspuTE REsOLUoN, PUBLIC SERVICES Div. AMERICAN BAR ASS'N,
ALTERNATIVE DispurE RESOUTIoN: MEDIATION AND THE LAW: WILL REASON PREVAIL? 41 (eds.

Ray, Kestner, Freedman, and Clare Aug. 9, 1983) (panel discussion series, topic 3-1983) [hereinafter
MEDIATION).

2. 1I at 49.
3. Id. at 51.
4. Id. at 49-52.

5. 1d. at 53.
6. I1&at 58.
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as a viable form of alternative dispute resolution.7 Both state and federal judges
are beginning to recognize the desirability of mediation as an alternative to
adjudication and the necessity of protecting the confidential communications which
are key to its effectiveness." Virtually every established mediation program uses
confidentiality as a part of the agreement to mediate9 and most scholarly articles
on the topic call for at least some form of legislative or judicial protection of this
confidentiality in mediation proceedings."0 But, it is almost as true today as it
was in 1984 that, "[u]nder current law... it is far from clear that a mediator can
back up a promise that everything said in mediation will remain confidential.""
Surveys indicate that the number of unreported cases involving a subpoena for
mediators or for information disclosed in mediation is on the rise. 2
The purpose of this comment is to give mediators a response to the question,
13
The current
"Will everything said in the mediation really remain confidential?"
status of the law governing confidentiality of mediation will be summarized, and
relevant cases will be reviewed to determine their impact on specific issues.

II. THE MEDIATION PROCESS
Mediation has been defined as "a voluntary process in which a neutral third
party, who lacks authority to impose a solution, helps participants reach their own
agreement for resolving a dispute or planning a transaction."1 4 In its simplest

7. See, e.g., Freedman & Prigoff, Confidentiality in Mediation: The Need for Protection,2 0O

RESOL 37, 37-39 (1986) (parties will not disclose deep-seated feelings and underlying
without confidentiality; it would be unfair to the less sophisticated party to allow the
to be used outside the mediation, and mediators must remain neutral in fact and
Friedman, Protectionof Confidentialityin the Mediation of MinorDisputes, 11 CAP. U.L.
REV. 181, 196 (1982); Note,ProtectingConfidentiality in Mediation, 98 HARV. L. REv. 441,441,44445 (1984) ("Confidentiality fosters an atmosphere of trust essential to mediation.").
8. See infra notes 66-74 and accompanying text.
9. Note, supra note 7, at 441. See generally MEDIATION, supra note 1, at 80.
10. See generally MEDIATION, supra note 1, at 68-90; Friedman, supra note 7, at 211; Murphy,
J. DISP.
motivations
proceedings
perception);
ST.

In the Wake of Tarasoff. Mediation and the Duty to Disclose, 35 CATH. U.L. REV. 209, 221-22, 22627 (1985); ProposedLegislation on CriticalIssues in Mediation, 2 Ono ST. J. DisP. RESOL 121, 12527 (1986) (panel discussion on proposed amendments to FED. R. EviD. 408 and proposed model state

statutes).
11. Note, supra note 7, at 441; see also Freedman & Prigoff, supranote 7, at 39; Murphy, supra
note 10, at 209-11, 226-27.
12. Freedman & Prigoff, supra note 7, at 42.

13. In this comment the term "confidential" is used to denote information which is both
confidential and privileged. This comment is written from the perspective that both are equally
necessary if parties are to feel free to disclose private or damaging information in the mediation.
Legally the terms are quite different. Confidentiality bars public disclosure by the holder of the

information but is no impediment to that information being used in a court of law. Privilege renders
the information inadmissible but does not necessarily prevent its disclosure to the public. See Hayden,
Should There be a PsychotherapistPrivilege in Military Courts-Martial?, 123 MIL L. REV. 31, 33
(1989).
14. Comment, Mediation and Medical Malpractice Disputes: Potential Obstacles in the
TraditionalLawyer's Perspective, 1990 J. DISP. REsOL 371, 373.
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terms mediation may be characterized as one mediator trying to get two
participants to do that which they least desire to do-talk to each other.
Mediation is less about disputes and more about people. Mediation is a
communication process; solving legal problems is simply a byproduct. 5
Mediators may give advice and structure discussions, but whatever they do is
directed toward achieving a durable agreement which is acceptable to both
Perhaps the most significant difference between mediation and
parties.'
between the
adjudication is that mediation often structures future relationships
parties, something for which adjudication is ill-suited. 17
A.

The Role of Confidentiality in Mediation

A growing number of courts throughout the nation describe their perceptions
of the mediation process in published opinions."5 They seem to accept the
proposition that confidentiality is an important ingredient in any successful
mediation. 9 A federal district court in New York noted that for mediation to be
effective parties must disclose their private views, needs, and future tactics."
They will only be willing to do this if they can be assured that these confidential
communications will not later be used against them. 2
In addressing such an assurance, the District of Columbia Circuit Court of
Appeals was asked by a labor group to oust the National Mediation Board's22
jurisdiction over a labor dispute thus paving the way for arbitration or a strike.
The court held that it would not require the mediator to testify as to his reasons
for refusing to discontinue mediation. 23 Mediation was characterized as a subtle
and delicate process, 24 where the mediator functions as a catalyst, and where
privacy is a key element without which the process has little hope of success.'
In Local 808, Building Maintenance, Service and Railroad Workers v.
NationalMediation Board,' the District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals
reaffirmed and extended its earlier praise and deference for the mediation process.
To remain
The court held that mediation is the antithesis of justiciability.'

15. MEDIATION, supra note 1, at 48.

16.
(1984).
17.
18.
19.
20.

Chaykin, MediatorLiability: A New Role for FiduciaryDuties?, 53 U. ON. L. REV. 731, 762
Note, supra note 7, at 443.
See infra notes 20-33, 67-74 & 108-40.
See infra notes 20-33 & 223-28.
In re Joint E. and S. Dists. Asbestos Litig., 737 F. Supp. 735, 739 (E. and S.D.N.Y. 1990).

21. Id.
22. International Ass'n of Machinists and Aerospace Workers v. National Mediation Bd., 425 F.2d

527, 529 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
23. Id. at 540.
24. Id. at 534.
25. Id. at 538.
26. 888 F.2d 1428 (D.C. Cir. 1989).
27. Id. at 1435.
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effective the mediator must be perceived as impartial by the parties.' The court
described mediation as a "black box" where mediators work their own brand of
magic to break deadlocks by constantly adapting to changing dynamics in an effort
to promote amicable resolution. 29 The mediation process is an "art form"
fundamentally different from adjudication." It focuses on breaking impasses and
must be insulated from outside intervention to succeed. 31 The court concluded
that parties must be free to advance possible solutions without fear that these
solutions will later be used against them or bind them if they prove unsatisfactory.32

Progress is often achieved during private caucuses where one party discloses
information to the mediator which if known by the other side would be embarrassing or result in an extreme bargaining disadvantage. Such insight into the private
motivations of the parties allows the mediator to devise innovative solutions which
would be impossible unless the mediator was privy to the actual private goals of
the parties. All of this is threatened by calling mediators before a court and
forcing them to divulge confidences. It would destroy both that mediator's
effectiveness and the potential client's willingness to risk exposure. It would
viability of mediation and significantly reduce the chances
undermine the future
33
for future succeSS.
B. The Role of Trust in Mediation
Confidentiality is vitally important to mediation because it facilitates
disclosure. People will not disclose personal needs, strategies, and information if
they feel it might be used against them.34 In normal interpersonal relationships
trust is built on past positive experiences. Conversely, in mediation, two people
who know from past experience they should not trust each other are thrust together
against their will and expected to give their most immediate enemy the tools
needed to cause great emotional pain and financial damage. As a result,
confidentiality facilitates mediation in the same way trust facilitates friendship.
Confidentiality deprives the disputants of the ability to use the information they
gain from the mediation to the detriment of the other party thus paving the way
for meaningful interaction between the parties in a relatively non-threatening
environment.

28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Id. at 1436.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Id.; Asbestos Litig., 737 F. Supp. at 739.
34. See generally Rempel and Holmes, How Do ! Trust Thee?, PsYcHoLOGY TODAY, Feb. 1986,
at 28-34.
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C. PracticalImplications
Most parties to a mediation, if they consider the issue at all, assume that
everything said in the mediation will not be disclosed publicly or used against
them in a court of law. One ABA survey indicates that of the 288 programs
mediation proceedings were
surveyed, most respondents assumed that their
35
privileged even though they likely were not.
Perhaps mediators do not overtly make such blanket promises, but the parties
may justifiably draw such conclusions from the conduct of the mediator. Virtually
every mediation begins with the mediator eliciting a promise, often in writing, that
all proceedings will be held in confidence by everyone present.' In order to
induce a party to divulge private feelings and the true nature of the conflict, the
mediator may assure the party that anything said will not be repeated outside the
mediation without permission.37 The resulting disclosure of such information is
evidence of the party's belief that their disclosure is confidential. Surely, no one
would admit damaging information if they expected it to be discussed openly in
their community or used against them in a later trial. The very nature of a caucus
between one party and the mediator justifies the inference that the mediator will
not disclose the information to the other party without permission. In addition, all
persons present promise to keep everything private. The average person tends to
assume that people are bound by their word. 38 If the mediation is court ordered
or if a prosecutor recommends the mediator, the parties may give the mediator's
assurances even greater weight.
The nuances of the unenforceability of promises made without consideration,
evidentiary privilege, and contracts being void as against public policy are lost on
lay persons. Mediators should take steps to discover their client's beliefs about
confidentiality and frankly disclose the true status of the law in their jurisdiction.
Inducing disclosure of private information from a reluctant party on a representation of confidentiality which the mediator knows to be false is an unacceptable
practice.39
HI. CONFIDENTIALITY UNDER EXISTING LAW
Mediation is primarily a settlement device. Consequently, it is assumed that
any protection applicable to settlement negotiations generally should be applicable
for bona
to mediation, at least to the extent that the mediation serves as a vehicle
4
fide settlement negotiations as defined by the applicable doctrine. 0

35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.

See Freedman & Prigoff, supra note 7, at 42.
Id. at 38.
Friedman, supra note 7, at 197.
Cf. Freedman & Prigoff, supra note 7, at 42.
Cf. Stulberg, Mediator Immunity, 2 OHIO ST. J. DISP. REsoL 85, 87 (1986).
See infra notes 45-57 and accompanying text.
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A. Common Law
At common law, only the actual offer of settlement was excluded from
evidence in a trial.41 Often, parties were dismayed to learn that even parts of
their offers to settle contained independent statements of fact which could be used
against them in court.' In fact, even the actual offer to settle was admissible if
offered to prove something other than liability, such as agency, bias, or impeachment. ' In fact, the common law exclusion was no obstacle to the clever
attorney.' Clearly, under the common law no mediator could expect to honor
his promise of confidentiality if the dispute later went to court.
B. The Federal Rules
1. Federal Rule of Evidence 4081
The advent of the Federal Rules of Evidence expanded the confidentiality of
settlement negotiations. Although the rule does not expressly cover mediation, it
provides protection for statements made in an attempt to settle disputes.'" Hence,
the rule at least tangentially extends to statements made by parties to a dispute
during a mediation. 47 Most likely, it does not block introduction of the mediator's perceptions, statements and conduct, but the courts have yet to address this
issue.

41. Green, A Heretical View of Mediation Privilege, 2 OHIo ST. J. DisP. RESOL 1, 15-16 (1986);

Note, supra note 7, at 447.
42. Freedman & Prigoff, supra note 7, at 40; Green, supra note 41, at 16; Note, supra note 7, at
447.
43. Cf. Truck Ins. Exch. v. L. N. Hale, 95 Ariz. 76, 79, 386 P.2d 846, 847 (1963).
44. See generally Brazil, Protecting the Confidentiality of Settlement Negotiations, 39 HASINGS
LJ. 955, 957-58 (1988).
45. About half of the states have adopted analogous rules. Note, supra note 7, at 448.
46. FED. R. Evm. 408.
47. Friedman, supra note 7, at 205 (FED. R. Evil). 408 and FED. R.CRim. P. 11(eX6) should be
easily extended to cover mediation).
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Federal Rule of Evidence 408 provides that an offer of compromise shall be
inadmissible to show liability or invalidity of a claim. 4 While affording
substantially more confidentiality than the common law, the rule is far from a
guarantee of complete confidentiality of the information presented in a mediation.
Rule 408, by its terms, does not apply in cases where the validity or amount
of a claim is not in dispute,49 nor where the offer or settlement does not involve
some valuable consideration. As written, the rule might remove many neighborhood justice and minor criminal diversionary mediations from its scope. Often,
in such cases the mediation is concerned with exploring underlying feelings and
hidden agendas rather than any tangible dispute over liability or value. 50 Such
proceedings might not even be settlement negotiations as contemplated by Rule
408.51
Rule 408 fails to protect confidentiality in another way. It allows admission
of settlement offers and accompanying conduct and statements when offered to
prove or disprove anything other than liability. 2 The scope and nature of
disclosures common to mediation are often much broader than other forms of
dispute resolution 53 and suggest that a mediation would provide a wealth of
impeachment, bias, and various other information, as well as suggesting avenues
of inquiry for interrogatories and depositions.
Aside from the exceptions to Rule 408 which create a window into the
mediation itself, the rule fails in a more serious way-it affords no protection
whatsoever for the final mediated agreement.' Thus, if an agreement is reached
in which one party admits liability or guilt, that agreement could be used against
him in a later criminal trial initiated by the state, or a civil trial initiated by a third
party. If the liable party fails to perform the agreement, it could be used against
him in a later civil trial by the original party. Even though such use is necessary

48. Federal Rule of Evidence 408 states:
Compromise and Offers to Compromise
Evidence of (1) furnishing or offering or promising to furnish, or (2) accepting or offering
or promising to accept, a valuable consideration in compromising or attempting to
compromise a claim which was disputed as to either validity or amount, is not admissible
to prove liability for or invalidity of the claim or its amount. Evidence of conduct or
statements made in compromise negotiations is likewise not admissible. This rule does
not require the exclusion of any evidence otherwise discoverable merely because it is
presented in the course of compromise negotiations. This rule also does not require
exclusion when the evidence is offered for another purpose, such as proving bias or
prejudice of a witness, negativing a contention of undue delay, or proving an effort to
obstruct a criminal investigation or prosecution.
FED. R. EVID. 408.
49. See Murphy, supra note 10, at 233.
50. MEDIAtiON, supra note 1, at 44. (mediation involves two parties getting the facts out and
negotiating. The rule covers only the negotiation).
51. Freedman & Prigoff, supra note 7, at 40.
52. Hudspeth v. Commissioner, 914 F.2d 1207, 1214 (9th Cir. 1990); Note, supra note 7, at 44950.
53. Friedman, supra note 7, at 197 n.121.
54. Id. at 206-07.
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to preserve the enforceability of mediated agreements, parties have a right to be
informed about this breach of confidence. As a result, mediated agreements are
far from confidential under Rule 408.
In addition to the evidentiary loopholes discussed above, Rule 408 fails to
guarantee the privacy necessary to achieve the broader goals of mediation.55
Rule 408 does not prevent discovery of the mediation proceedings, nor does it bar
public disclosure of the substance of the proceedings by those present at the
mediation.s In order for mediation to succeed, the parties must feel that any
personal information they reveal will not be used against them.57 Proving
liability is not the only damaging use of such information. Unless parties can feel
safe that sensitive information will not leave the room, they will be reluctant to
disclose and the mediation process will suffer.
2. Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11(e)(6)
Federal rule of criminal procedure 11(e)(6) is the criminal counterpart to Rule
408. While motivated by similar policy concerns, Rule 11 bars evidence of offers
to plead guiltyss The rule, by its express terms, would not exclude the
admission of statements made at a mediation between two private parties or the
agreement which they signed. 59 Consequently, the potential for mediation
resulting in later criminal conviction should be of great concern to any mediator
who promises confidentiality to parties.

55. Cf. Green v. Ucceli, 207 Cal. App. 3d 1112,117-19, 255 Cal. Rptr. 315,316-18 (1989) (court
sealed the record of a divorce proceeding. One of the attorneys involved in the case made public some
information disclosed during the trial. The opposing party sued the attorney under California's public
disclosure tort. The court dismissed the action, holding the order sealing the records of the proceedings
bound only the clerk.).
56. Freedman & Prigoff, supra note 7, at 40; Green, supra note 41, at 18.
57. See InternationalAss'n ofMachinist &Aerospace Workers, 425 F.2d at 534-43; cf Asbestos
Litig., 737 F. Supp. at 738-39.
58. FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(eX6).
59. Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11(eX6) provides:
Except as otherwise provided in this paragraph, evidence of the following is not, in any
civil or criminal proceeding, admissible against the defendant who made the plea or was
a participant in the plea discussions:
(A) a plea of guilty which was later withdrawn;
(B) a plea of nolo contendere;
(C) any statement made in the course of any proceedings under this rule regarding
either of the foregoing pleas; or
(D) any statement made in the course of plea discussions with an attorney for the
government which do not result in a plea of guilty or which result in a plea of guilty later
withdrawn.
However, such a statement is admissible (i) in any proceeding wherein another statement
made in the course of the same plea or plea discussions has been introduced and the
statement ought in fairness be considered contemporaneously with it, or (ii) in a criminal
proceeding for perjury or false statement if the statement was made by the defendant
under oath, on the record, and in the presence of counsel.
FED. R. CaiM. P. 11(eX6); cf. United States v. Gullo, 672 F. Supp. 99, 103 (W.D.N.Y. 1987).
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3. Federal Rule of Evidence 501
a. The Legal Framework
Federal rule of evidence 501 provides authority for courts to extend common
law privilege to the mediation context. 60 It leaves the privilege issue to the
resolution of the individual court. Historically, courts employ a four part test
when evaluating a claim of privilege:
(1) The communications must originate in a confidence that they will
not be disclosed. (2) This element of confidentiality must be essential
to the full and satisfactory maintenance of the relations between the
parties. (3) The relation must be one which in the opinion of the
community ought to be sedulously fostered. (4) The injury that would
inure to the relation by the disclosure of the communications must be
greater than the benefit thereby gained by the correct disposal of
litigation."1
While extension of a mediation privilege is arguably justified,62 the passage of
new state laws limiting the use of information gained in mediation sessions limit
the harms attendant to disclosure and thereby undermine the fourth element of the
test.6 In addition, scholars argue that confidentiality is not essential to the
success of mediation."
However, there seems to be a growing recognition among judges throughout
the United States of the importance of mediation and the vital role confidentiality
plays in the process. The very adoption of Federal Rule of Evidence 408 betrays
the belief of those who drafted and approved it-the belief that the settlement
process in general was worthy of special treatment.6

60. Rule 501 states:
General Rule
Except as otherwise required by the Constitution of the United States or provided by Act
of Congress or in rules prescribed by the Supreme Court pursuant to statutory authority,
the privilege of a witness, person, government, State, or political subdivision thereof shall
be governed by the principles of the common law as they may be interpreted by the courts
of the United States in the light of reason and experience. However, in civil actions and
proceedings, with respect to an element of a claim or defense as to which State law
supplies the rule of decision, the privilege of a witness, person, government, State, or
political subdivision thereof shall be determined in accordance with State law.
FED. R. EVID. 501.
61. Friedman, supra note 7, at 209 (citing J. WIGMORE, EVIDNCE §§ 1061-62 (3d ed. 1940)).
62. Freedman & Prigoff, supra note 7, at 43-44.
63. Under confidentiality laws less information would be disclosed so less injury to the
relationship would result. The confidentiality law, if it performed as intended would obviate the need
for a privilege and thus reduce the likelihood a court would grant a privilege.
64. Green, supra note 41, at 2.
65. Hulter v. Commissioner, 83 T.C. 663, 665 (1984).
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b. Emerging JudicialAttitudes Relative to the
Privilege Issue
If mediation is to thrive it must have the support and confidence of the
Judiciary. Courts will be reluctant to embrace a common law mediation privilege
or to construe and enforce confidentiality laws if they do not have faith in the
desirability and effectiveness of the mediation process. A growing body of case
law suggests that any skepticism which the Judiciary might initially have held
toward the mediation process is dissipating.66 The following cases demonstrate
the willingness on the part of many state and federal judges to endorse the
expanded use of mediation and surrender some judicial power. This surrender
comes in the form of evidentiary privileges and special procedural dispensations,
in order to create an environment in which mediation can flourish. Such judicial
endorsement of the process may foreshadow a readiness to confront the more
difficult issues such as privilege and confidentiality.
The judges of a Florida Court of Appeals fully endorsed mediation in the
custody context and strongly advised all of the trial courts of the state to follow
the lead of one circuit which had implemented a mediation program to settle
custody disputes.67 The Florida Court of Appeals noted that 1,116 of the 1,276
cases referred to mediation were settled-an 86% success rate."
Minnesota courts recognized a mediation privilege even before their
legislature's newly passed statutory privilege became effective.' The courts
recognized a compelling need for confidentiality in the mediation process because
it fosters party confidence in the mediator and the process as well as supporting
the perception of the mediator's impartiality.7 °
One New York trial judge construed New York's Mediation Confidentiality
statute as non-waivable. 7' He stressed the need for confidentiality as recognized
by the legislature as support for this construction of the statute. And the
policy protecting
Supreme Court of Illinois held that there was a "strong public
73
the confidentiality of labor-negotiating strategy sessions."
This emerging judicial ratification of the mediation process may lead courts
to find a common law privilege for mediation. Despite the logic of a mediation

66. See infra notes 67-74 and accompanying text.
67. Anderson v. Anderson, 494 So. 2d 237, 238 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1986).
68. d
69. In re Parkway Manor Healthcare Center, 448 N.W.2d 116, 121 (Minn. Ct. App. 1989).
70. Sonenstahl v. L.E.L.S., Inc., 372 N.W.2d 1, 6 (Minn. Ct. App. 1985) (privilege extended to
mediation proceedings after state legislature passed mediation confidentiality statute but before its
effective date).
71. People v. Snyder, 129 Misc. 2d 137, 138-39,492 N.Y.S.2d 890,891-92 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1985)
(prosecutor subpoenaed records of mediation between defendant and victim which occurred before
defendant allegedly shot victim dead).
72. Id., 492 N.Y.S.2d at 892.
73. Illinois Educ. Labor Relations Bd. v. Homer Community Consol. School Dist. No. 208, 132
Ill. 2d 29, 38, 547 N.E.2d 182, 187 (1989).
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privilege, no court has found one to exist absent statutory support. It is important
to note, however, that any privilege granted is not likely to extend to student/trainee mediators who do not yet meet the definition of a professional. 74
C. State Confidentiality Laws
Already, many states have adopted laws affording confidentiality to
mediation. 75 These laws range from limited immunity from subpoena76 to full
immunity which would bar any disclosure even to the point of preventing
challenge or construction of the agreement."
The newness of these laws leaves open the question of how they will fair
against first amendment and freedom of information challenges.78 At least one
federal district court has already held that freedom of information and free press
concerns prevailed over the settlement contract entered into by the parties which
required destruction of discovery material. 79 If mediation ever evolves into a
process of settling disputes which are of interest to the public, these state
confidentiality statutes are sure to be challenged on first amendment grounds.
State confidentiality statutes are the most effective and viable means available
to protect mediation, but even these laws are not without exceptions. Many
jurisdictions leave unchanged mandatory reporting of ongoing child abuse and
criminal conduct."' This poses special problems for mediators in family law and
criminal diversion programs. Any mediator who promises that anything said will
remain confidential is almost certain to be proven wrong, but to warn of potential
disclosure in these contexts could have a devastating effect on success.8 2
Like Federal Rule of Evidence 408, many of the state laws lack reference to
the confidentiality of any settlement agreement reached by the parties and so leave
open the possibility that it might be used in later criminal or civil trials.
Conversely, some state statutes, if applied literally, preclude testimony as to

74. Friedman, supra note 7, at 209.
75. Green, supra note 41, at 15 n.22 (fourteen states have at least partial confidentiality statutes,
including: Arkansas, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Iowa, Florida, Michigan, Montana, New
Hampshire, New York, New Jersey, North Carolina, Oklahoma and Oregon).
76. Id.

77. See Note, supra note 7, at 452-53; N.L.R.B. v. Joseph Macaluso, Inc., 618 F.2d 51,53-56 (9th

Cir. 1980).
78. The Attorney General of Florida concluded that mediation records were not shielded from
public access. 81 Op. Fla. Att'y Gen. 157 (1981). The same would likely not be true under present
day Florida law. See Anderson, 494 So. 2d at 237.
79. United States v. Kentucky Utils., 124 F.R.D. 146, 150 (E.D. Ky. 1989); see infra text
accompanying notes 96-99.
80. See supra notes 40-75 and accompanying text.
81. Murphy, supra note 10, at 209-10, 242. But, New York's Attorney General has rendered an
opinion that the New York confidentiality law does shield admission of child abuse. Id. at 220-21.
82. Id. at 222-23.
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whether the mediated agreement was achieved under fraud or duress or whether
it was achieved at all.83
Many of the state laws only protect disclosures related to the topic of the
mediation.84 Such a provision is ill-suited to mediation. In a courtroom, all
activity revolves around well defined (pleaded) issues, and relevancy is the
accepted rule. Mediation, however, operates on a completely different definition
of relevance.m Anything likely to promote consensus is relevant; it is crucial.
The scope of disclosure in mediation is dictated by the true nature of the dispute.
A dispute diverted to a mediation program after charges of criminal tampering (for
instance, tire slashing) may have nothing to do with vandalism and everything to
do with a fight the two disputants had 20 years earlier in grade school." If the
criminal charge is settled in the first 20 minutes and the mediation continues for
three more hours, are all of those disclosures open to the prying eyes of the
courts? Such questions must be answered before mediators can make reliable
promises of confidentiality.
Any reliance on state law as a source of confidentiality should be tempered
by general observations. First, state confidentiality statutes do not bind federal
judges in criminal matters.87 Second, state civil confidentiality statutes do not
necessarily apply to criminal trials.U
D. ContractsLimiting Admissibility of Disclosures
Agreements purporting to limit access to information disclosed in a mediation
are of dubious effect at best."9 Given the strong public policy favoring courts
making decisions based on all available evidence, these contracts could be
declared void as against public policy. 9°

83. Note, supra note 7, at 452-53.
84. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 44.201 (1988); IOWA CODE § 679.12 (1987); Mo. REV. STAT. §
435.014(2) (1988); N.Y. JuD. LAw § 849-b(6) (Consol. 1989); VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-581.22 (1988);
WASH. REV. CODE § 7.75.050 (1988).
85. Freedman, Confidentiality: A Closer Look, ALTERNATIVE DisPurE RESOLLrnON: MEDIATION
AND THE LAW: WILL REASON PREVAIL? 75 (eds. Ray, Kestner, Freedman, and Clare 1983) (panel

discussion series, topic 3-1983).
86. Cf. MEDIATION, supra note 1, at 29-31, 44.
87. See Gullo, 672 F. Supp. at 99 (court found a privilege under FED. R. Evnm. 501 on the strength
of New York's confidentiality law).
88. Cf. Williams v. State, 178 Ga. App. 216, 217, 342 S.E.2d 703, 704 (1986). The defendant
signed an agreement admitting he took $60,000 from his employer and agreeing to repay it. The
agreement was introduced against him in a criminal proceeding when he failed to make the required
payments. He was convicted. Id. at 216, 342 S.E.2d at 704.
89. Murphy, supra note 10, at 221.
90. Freedman & Prigoff, supra note 7, at 41; Note, supra note 7, at 450-51.
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1. Judicial Disfavor of Anti-Admissibility Agreements
91
In State v. Castellano,
the Florida Court of Appeals held that even though
a mediator may have told9 the parties that everything said in the mediation was
confidential, this guarantee did not bar the mediator from testifying. The
defendant was charged with the first degree murder of a man with whom he was
mediating a dispute. 3 He claimed self defense and wanted the mediator to
testify as to threats which the victim had made during the mediation sessions.'
The court held that the rule barring admissions of offers of compromise and
settlement negotiations was inapplicable to criminal cases and that if the legislature
considers confidentiality essential to the viability of mediation it should pass a law
to that effect.9s The court did not address whether a confidentiality statute
preventing a defendant from introducing exculpatory evidence could withstand
constitutional challenge.
In United States v. Kentucky Utilities Co.,96 the federal government and an
utility settled a suit with anti-trust ramifications on the condition that all discovery
documents in the possession of the government were to be held confidential and
destroyed as quickly as possible. The court reversed an initial protective order
when members of the press intervened seeking access to the remaining documents. The court held that it was not bound by confidentiality agreements of
this kind98 and that the press, acting in the interest of the public, had a right to
the documents held by the government."
While it is possible that courts would view mediation agreements differently
than protective orders and agreements, that is by no means certain. To the extent
that mediation programs receive public funds they may be subject to freedom of
information laws, 1" and even private programs remain unprotected if the state
confidentiality laws are held violative of the First Amendment right of free
101
press.

91. 460 So. 2d 480 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984).
92. Enticing reluctant parties into a mediation on assurances of confidentiality would likely
constitute actionable fraud. Chaykin, The Liabilities and Immunities of Mediators: A Hostile
Environment for Model Legislation, 2 Ono ST. J. Disp. RESOL 47, 57 n.47 (1986).
93. Castellano, 460 So. 2d at 481.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 481-82. The Florida legislature did pass such a law shortly after this case. See FLA.
STAT. § 44.201.
96. 124 F.R.D. 146.
97. Id. at 149-53.
98. Id. at 149-50.
99. See id. at 152-53.
100. Note, supra note 7, at 451.
101. But see generally Note, The Public'sNeed to Know vs. Effective Settlement Techniques: The
FirstAmendment Confronts the Summary Jury Trial, 1990 J. DIsP. RESOL 149, 151-61 (discussing the
Sixth Circuit's recent holding that closing a summary jury trial to the press and public did not violate
the first amendment).
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2. Judicial Receptiveness for Anti-Admissibility Agreements
The viability of mediation based anti-admissibility agreements may be
increasing. Several courts find a strong public policy supporting confidentiality
of mediation sessions. 1' 2 To the extent that courts see such agreements as
furthering the public policy favoring mediation, they are less likely to be voided
as against the public policy favoring admissibility of all available evidence.
In Pipefitters v. Mechanical Contractors Association of Colorado,'0 3 the

court held that the public interest in obtaining every person's evidence was outweighed by the need to preserve an effective labor mediation program." ° The
court concluded that the key element in successful federal labor mediation is that
parties are able to discuss confidential concerns frankly with federal mediators
without fear of disclosure. 1°5 It noted that Congress recognized the importance
of confidentiality when it exempted information gained in mediation proceedings
from federal freedom of information laws."° While the Pipefitters decision
provides hope that confidentiality agreements will be enforced, it should be noted
that the court was acting under the authority of a statute which made the
information sought confidential. 0 7
In Sonenstahl v. L.E.L.S., Inc.,' °8 the Minnesota Court of Appeals found a

compelling need to protect the confidentiality of labor mediations between police
officers and the city. A group of detectives sought to force the mediator to testify
that the union negotiators had repeatedly turned down offers to raise the
detective's salaries in order to get concessions on overall salaries."° The court
held that the information sought was privileged, citing the state's newly passed but
not yet effective mediation confidentiality statute as a policy motivation.110
Sonenstahl supports the assumption that there is an emerging public policy
supporting mediated settlements which may be strong enough to overcome the
courts' desire to make decisions on all available evidence. Again, this court
looked to legislative enactments as part of the justification for the balance it
struck.
The Illinois Supreme Court likewise found the existence of a "strong public
policy protecting the confidentiality of labor-negotiating Strategy sessions.""'
The court in Illinois Education Labor Relations Board v. Homer Community
ConsolidatedSchool DistrictNo. 20812 relied upon the National Labor Relations

102. See infra notes 103-34 and accompanying text.
103. No. 79-C-1382 (D.Colo. June, 26 1980) (WESTLAW, DCr database).

104. Id. at 2.
105. Id. at 1.

106.
107.
108.
109.

Id.
Id,
372 N.W.2d 1.
Id. at 6.

110. Id. at 6-7.
2d at 38, 547 N.E.2d at 187.
111. Education Labor Relations Bd., 132 Ill.
112. 132 Ifl. 2d 29, 547 N.E.2d 182.
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Board refusal to compel a federal mediator to reveal information gained during a
mediated session.113 It seems that courts are more likely to find such public
policies in the labor mediation context and when there is some tangible governmental action to support such a conclusion.
Perhaps the strongest manifestation of the emerging public policy driving the
proliferation of mediation programs surfaces in People v. Snyder."4 Two men
were mediating a dispute which eventually ended in one party allegedly killing the
other." The district attorney subpoenaed the records of the mediation from the
Community Dispute Resolution Center in Erie County. 1 6 The records were
protected by New York's confidentiality law and the court quashed the subpoena.1 17 The state argued that the defendant had waived any privilege."' The
court held that the public policy of the state was to insure a mediation atmosphere
free from restraint and intimidation by guaranteeing absolute confidentiality.' 9
On the strength of this policy and the clear language of the statute the court held
that the privilege was absolute. Not even the parties could waive the privilege.' 20
Snyder yields two important inferences. First, the public policy favoring
confidentiality is so strong that it outweighs the wishes of the individual. Second,
and more importantly, the policy is not designed solely to protect the needs of the
individual. It is a societal goal to resolve disputes without resort to the courts, and
if the courts must close their eyes to relevant evidence to accomplish that goal,
that is a detriment the society is willing to endure.
The Georgia Court of Appeals considers mediation proceedings to be
confidential in the context of criminal proceedings.' 2 ' In Byrd v. State," the
defendant was charged with stealing. He allegedly converted $800 paid on a
remodeling contract to his own use."' The consumer filed charges after the
The trial court ordered mediation of the
contractor failed to begin work.1'
dispute at the Neighborhood Justice Center of Atlanta, Inc."'2 The disputants
After
reached an agreement which defendant signed but failed to perform."
eight months of non-performance the case proceeded to trial and the prosecutor

113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.

Id. at 39, 547 N.E.2d at 187.
129 Misc. 2d 137, 492 N.Y.S.2d 890.
d. at 137, 492 N.Y.S.2d at 891.
Id.
Id. at 140, 492 N.Y.S.2d at 892.
Id. at 137, 492 N.Y.S.2d at 891.
Id. at 139, 492 N.Y.S.2d at 892.
Id. at 138-39, 492 N.Y.S.2d at 892.
Byrd v. State, 186 Ga. App. 446, 449, 367 S.E.2d 300, 303 (1988).
186 Ga. App. 446, 367 S.E.2d 300.
Id.
Id. at 446-47, 367 S.E.2d at 301.
Id. at 447-48, 367 S.E.2d at 302.
Id. at 446, 367 S.E.2d at 301.
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There
sought to introduce the mediated settlement as an admission of guilt.
was no confidentiality statute, but the court refused the evidence on policy
grounds. 17
The court reasoned that no one would sign a settlement document if they
knew it could later be used against them.12 It concluded that confidentiality
was essential to the integrity of the mediation process.' As justification for its
holding, the court pointed to the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure's protection
31
It
of plea bargaining and the public policy favoring out of court settlements.
the
against
Byrd
were
found
in
also noted that pretrial diversions such as in those
public policy of the state and Constitutional concerns implicating Fourth and Fifth
amendment protections."12 The court stated that a different outcome might occur
if this were a private, totally voluntary mediation, rather than a court ordered
diversion program. 33 Three members of the court joined in a strong dissent and
134
would admit the evidence for use as an admission of consciousness of guilt.
Further evidence of the growing trend toward court protection of mediation
may be found in the handling of confidentiality challenges under various sunshine
laws. The federal Freedom of Information Act specifically exempts from public
disclosure information which government mediators gain as a result of mediation.135 In Minnesota Education Association v. Bennett,'36 the Minnesota
Supreme Court resolved a conflict between the mediation statute and an open
meetings law applying to school boards. The mediator authorized a private caucus
37
by the school board to decide if it would raise the limit of its salary offer.1
The other party claimed the sunshine law mandated that the meeting be open to
the public.138 The court held that since the statute authorized confidential
mediation sessions it was permissible for the mediator to authorize a private
caucus, not withstanding the open meetings law.' 39 A Florida Court of Appeals
avoided resolving a similar conflict by holding that since no final action could be
taken by the public entity at the mediated session, the sunshine law did not
apply."4

127. Id. at 448, 367 S.E.2d at 302.
128. Id. at 447-49, 367 S.E.2d at 302-03.
129. Id. at 448, 367 S.E.2d at 302.
130. Id.
131. Id. at 448, 367 S.E.2d at 303.
132. Id. at 449, 367 S.E.2d at 303.
133. Id.
134. Id. at 452, 367 S.E.2d at 304.
135. Piefuters, No. 79-C-1382, slip op. at 1 (D. Colo. June, 26 1980).
136. 321 N.W.2d 395 (Minn. 1992).
137. Id. at 396.
138. Id.
139. Id. at 399.
140. News-Press Publishing Co. v. Lee County, 570 So. 2d 1325, 1327 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1990)
(mediation between cities as to the location of a bridge).
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E. Informal Agreements with Courts and Prosecutors
Several diversion programs achieve great success with informal agreements
that any information disclosed in mediation will be excluded by local judges and
not used by prosecutors.141 The success of these arrangements is obviously
dependent on the personalities involved, but two observations may be helpful.
First, they are clearly unenforceable in any legal sense.' 42 Second, entanglements between the courts and mediators raise inescapable inferences of state action
counsel, due process,
thereby triggering constitutional concerns such as right to
14 3
privilege against self-incrimination and equal protection.

IV. REPRESENTATIVE CASES
Those seeking to predict the resolution of a particular confidentiality issue
should not overlook the substantial latitude vested in individual judges. Even
when a confidentiality statute exists in a jurisdiction it must be interpreted and
applied. The resolution of threshold factual issues determines whether the statute
applies to the given fact pattern and to what extent it applies. The individual
judge's attitude toward mediation in general and toward the case in particular may
skew the outcome of such preliminary issues. Much latitude is available to allow
judges to achieve the result they desire, especially where the controlling statute
lacks previous attention by other courts.
A court's resourcefulness in circumventing a privilege statute may be seen
in In re Rosson. '" State law provided for mandatory mediation of all child
custody disputes.14s Proceedings held pursuant to the law were privileged, but
the statute allowed the local court to adopt a local rule allowing the mediator to
report her recommendations to the court if the mediation was unsuccessful.'46

141. Friedman, supra note 7, at 200-01.
142. l. at 203.
143. A federal district court in New York held that a state law making mediation proceedings
confidential withstood a substantive due process challenge because it was rationally related to a
legitimate state end. New York State Inspection, Sec. and Law Enforcement Employees Dist. Council
82 v. New York State Pub. Relations Bd., 629 F. Supp. 33, 51 (N.D.N.Y. 1984).
The Michigan State Supreme Court was found to be immune from liability for promulgating a
mediation rule which allowed local courts to adopt mandatory mediation programs. The court noted
in dicta its feeling that the rule was constitutional. Alia v. Michigan Supreme Court, 906 F.2d 1100,
1102 (6th Cir. 1990).
In McLaughlin v.Superior Court the Court declared unconstitutional a local rule allowing child
custody mediators to give their opinions as to the most desirable placement of the child if the
mandatory mediation failed. The infirmity in the rule was in the fact that the mediation was
confidential and the parties were not allowed to cross examine the mediator as to the grounds for his
recommendation. McLaughlin, 140 Cal. App. 3d 473, 482-83, 189 Cal. Rptr. 479, 486-87 (1983).
144. 178 Cal. App. 3d 1094, 224 Cal. Rptr. 250 (1986).
145. Id. at 1099 n.4, 224 Cal. Rptr. at 254 n.4.
146. Id. at 1103-04, 224 Cal. Rptr. at 257.
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The local court in the instant case had no such local rule,1 47 but admitted the
mediators recommendations into evidence at trial after the parties failed to reach
an agreement. 1 8
The court of appeals held that the statute made the mediation privileged but
that the privilege belonged to the court and not the parties.1 49 Consequently, the
trial court's actions were upheld due to its power to waive the privilege over the
participants' objections." The court based this placement of the privilege with
the court, instead of the parties, on the statutory provision allowing the court to
adopt a local rule allowing mediators to disclose recommendations to the
court.

15 1

Perhaps the most comprehensive treatment of the confidentiality issue is
contained in United States v. Guilo.1 2 Defendant Gullo was charged with the
use of extraordinary means to collect an extension of credit under 18 U.S.C.
sections 872 and 874.13 The victim went to the police which referred him to
the Community Dispute Resolution Settlement Center. 5 4 Defendant signed an
agreement to arbitrate. 55 The arbitration process began with mediation but
provided for binding arbitration if the mediation proved unsuccessful. 5 6 The
agreement provided that "the neutral will hold all information received during the
hearing as confidential and will not voluntarily divulge that information."' 57 The
center was established and funded under a state statute which identified a
compelling need for viable methods of alternative dispute resolution and provided
substantial funding for such programs. 1m The chief administrator of the courts
administered the program.!5 9 The act empowered private organizations staffed
by their own trained personnel to handle community and minor criminal
disputes." It made all proceedings confidential and inadmissible in the state
courts.161 This defendant, however, was before a federal court on federal
criminal charges. The defendant claimed that any statements made by him during
the arbitration were involuntary and unconstitutionally obtained and, therefore,
sought their suppression. 62

147. Id.

148. Id.
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.

155.
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.

Id. at 1105, 224 Cal. Rptr. at 258.
Id.
Id.
672 F. Supp. 99.
Id. at 101.
ld. at 102.
Id.
1M.
td.
Id.
Id.
d. at 102-03.
Id.
Id. at 102.
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The federal district judge in Gullo held that since this was a voluntary
community program rather than a criminal pretrial diversion program there was
no state action to support the constitutional challenges raised. 63 The court also
rejected defendant's contention that the statements were privileged as a plea
bargain because no charges were pending against the defendant at the time the
statements were made. 1"
Defendant also claimed that the statements were privileged under Federal
Rule of Evidence 501 which leaves the determination of privilege to the statutes
and common law. 1'0 The federal court stated that it was not bound by the New
York law making mediations privileged, but it did consider the state law
justification for finding a common law privilege.' 66
The court applied a four part balancing test. First, it noted a strong public
policy favoring admission of all relevant facts in a criminal case.167 Second, it
1
recognized that confidentiality is the very core of successful mediation. " Third,
it noted that the state failed to demonstrate any particularized need for the
69
information in this particular case, and so that was not a factor to be balanced.
Finally, the court considered the damage to the local policy if the privilege was
not recognized. 70 While the court considered it unlikely that people would
refuse to participate because they feared their statements and actions might later
be used against them in a federal prosecution, it did feel that any disclosure would
undermine the overall effectiveness of the system. 71 After balancing these
considerations the court ultimately held that the mediation proceedings in question
were privileged and excluded all statements, terms and conditions of the settlement
from use at trial. 7 2
Gullo emphasizes the important point that state laws making mediation
proceedings confidential are not binding on federal courts. 73 While it is
unlikely that disputes which are mediated fall under federal jurisdiction, it has
already happened at least once and should not be ignored by mediators promising
confidentiality. Gullo is also important because it evidences the emerging judicial
respect for a process which was dismissed only a few years earlier and virtually
unheard of a decade before. With the increasing state movement toward
establishing alternative dispute resolution as a public policy, courts seem more
willing to adjust their perceptions concerning the role of courts in the dispute
resolution process and to accommodate the needs of the newer forum. Certainly,

163.
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.

Id. at
Id.
Id.
Id. at
Id. at
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at

103.

103-04.
104.

103.
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more accommodation is needed if mediation is to flourish, but cases like this one
represent substantial cause for hope.
V. DEFINING MEDIATION
The advent of state laws protecting the confidentiality of mediation
proceedings may force the courts to address a previously academic question:
What constitutes a "mediation"? By definition, state confidentiality laws separate
into two categories. Many are part of enabling legislation which establish
mediation programs, such as divorce or labor mediation, and require confidentiality
of proceedings pursuant to that legislative mandate.174 Often, a state agency
conducts such mediation.175 Such laws pose little definitional problems.
The blanket assertion that records and statements disclosed during a
"mediation" are confidential categorizes a second category of confidentiality
law. 176 Such laws, often found in evidence codes, are not linked to any specific
1
programs and at most require only the presence of an approved mediator. "
Even after defining mediation, the courts are forced to apply that definition to the
facts of each case. The diverse and flexible nature of mediation programs makes
such application difficult.
Insight into the difficulties of defining "mediation" may be seen in Lange v.
Marshall.7 s An attorney, accused of malpractice, claimed that he could not be
guilty of legal malpractice because he was acting as a mediator.' 79 The
defendant attorney claimed that because of his friendship with both parties, he had
refused to represent either in the divorce, but he did agree to draft the papers if

174. See, e.g., Mo. Sup. Cr. R. 17.
175. See generally Education Labor Relation Bd., 123 Ill. 2d 29, 547 N.E. 2d 182.
176. See, e.g., Mo. REV. STAT. § 435.014 (1988).
177. See generally Green, supra note 41, at 15-16. What definitional substance is present in the

statutes may be more indicative of an attempt by the proposing group to elevate their "profession"
above other grassroots settlement processes. One author has labeled the mediator based push for
confidentiality statutes as nothing more than "short sighted professional self-interest." Id. at 2.
One must ask whether requiring mediation to take place under the auspices of an approved
program, or be conducted by a trained, approved mediator, or that the agreement to mediate be a signed
writing, are legitimate attempts to regulate the quality of mediation, or simply attempts by mediators
to gain recognition of their chosen profession and comer the market on settlement negotiations. See
generally id. at 2, 30. If mediation eventually achieves the confidentiality its promoters desire,
businesses and other sophisticated litigants may begin to see the cost of a mediator as a small price
to pay to ensure that a candid remark during settlement negotiations will not be used against them in
later court action. Evidentiary privilege is justified by the nature of the process not the qualification
of the moderator. Cf. generally Chaykin, supra note 92, at 78 n.138.
178. 622 S.W.2d 237 (Mo. Ct. App. 1981).
179. Id. at 238. The Supreme Court of Vermont has disapproved of the process of one attorney's
mediating a divorce and then drafting the stipulation and presenting it in court. Such practice was held
to raise ethical concerns and result in the judge making his decision based on less than the full
information produced by the advocacy process. See Barbour v. Barbour, 146 Vt. 506, 511-12, 505
A.2d 1217, 1220-21 (1986).
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they could agree on the terms." ° After reaching an agreement, the papers were
prepared and signed. 81 Later, the woman became unhappy with the agreement
and retained another lawyer."s
Eventually, this new attorney acquired a more advantageous settlement for
her through litigation."s She sued the defendant attorney on grounds that he
failed to inquire into her husband's financial affairs and that he did not adequately
apprise her of her legal rights'TM The attorney claimed he had clearly informed
the parties that he was acting as a mediator rather than a lawyer.185 He believed
that to inform the woman of her legal rights or to investigate the financial status
of the parties would be a violation of his duty to remain neutral."s The court
woman to prove that the attorney's
awarded no damages due to the failure of 8the
7
actions proximately caused the damages.
Lange illustrates the difficulties in deciding what processes constitute
mediation for statutory purposes. The Missouri confidentiality statute, enacted in
1989, provides:
1. If all the parties to a dispute agree in writing to submit their
dispute to any forum for arbitration, conciliation or mediation, then no
person who serves as arbitrator, conciliator or mediator, nor any agent
or employee of that person, shall be subpoenaed or otherwise compelled
to disclose any matter disclosed in the process of setting up or
conducting the arbitration, conciliation or mediation.
2. Arbitration, conciliation and mediation proceedings shall be
regarded as settlement negotiations. Any communication relating to the
subject matter of such disputes made during the resolution process by
any participant, mediator, conciliator, arbitrator or any other person
present at the dispute resolution shall be a confidential communication.
No admission, representation, statement or other confidential communication made in setting up or conducting such proceedings not otherwise
discoverabless or obtainable shall be admissible as evidence or subject to
discovery.

180. Lange, 622 S.W.2d at 237,
181.
182.
183.
184.
185.
186.
187.
188.

Id. at 238.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
MO. REV. STAT. § 435.014 (emphasis added).
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Under the Missouri statute it is unclear whether the Lange case would qualify as
a mediation. 8 9 The statute seems to require both a written agreement to mediate
and that the mediation be conducted by a forum rather than an individual
mediator.' 90 In Lange, if the attorney and the parties communicated by letter,
it is entirely possible that both parties sent letters to the attorney agreeing to
mediate. Such letters might constitute the required agreement.
The term "forum" is more problematic. The statute might contemplate a
forum dedicated exclusively to mediation. It could, however, be a generic term,
broad enough to encompass any arena capable of sustaining the inherent elements
of mediation, such as a room with a table and chairs and a third party neutral to
act as mediator. Adoption of the narrow definition results in the demise of
independent mediators. Under the broader definition a law firm could constitute
a forum.
Section two of the Missouri statute contains the protection for the content of
the mediation. 9' Presumably, the requirements set forth in section one would
apply to section two, but the statute remains unclear. Section two could be read
as independent of section one because it affords a different kind of protection.
92
Courts resolve ambiguity in favor of reading statutes as non-redundant.'
Hence, a court might be reluctant to read the section one requirements into section
two because to do so would result in some redundancy. If section two is read
independent of section one then courts defining the term "mediation" can look
only to the plain meaning of the term and the context in which it is used.
Heelan v. Lockwood'93 demonstrates another example of the problem of
defining mediation. After being fired, a former manager sued his employer.'
An attorney, who held himself out as a third-party-neutral mediator, then
approached the employee. 9 s During the ensuing settlement talks, the employee
disclosed confidential information.'" Upon failure of the settlement attempts,
the employer hired the "mediator" to litigate the case for him.' 97 The employee
moved for disqualification because of the attorney's privity to confidential
information gained through the settlement talks.' 98 The attorney denied that he
had held himself out as a mediator and resisted disqualification.'" The court

189. Missouri Supreme Court rule 17.01-.08, adopted after the statute took effect, represents a
more comprehensive scheme answering many of the concerns raised here. It represents a separate
scheme allowing local courts to establish a mediation program and rules governing its conduct. Mo.
Sup. Cr. R. 17.01-.08.
190. See Mo. REv. STAT. § 435.014.1.
191. Mo. REv. STAT. § 435.014.2.
192. See, e.g., In re Estate of Dewitt, 603 S.W.2d 931, 935 (Mo. 1980).
193. 143 A.D.2d 881, 533 N.Y.S,2d 560 (N.Y. App. Div. 1988).
194. Id. at 882, 533 N.Y.S.2d at 561.
195. Id&
196. Id.
197. Id.
198. Id. at 882-83, 533 N.Y.S.2d at 561.
199. Id. at 883, 533 N.Y.S.2d at 561.
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held that any appearance of a conflict of interest justified disqualification and
removed the attorney."0
Heelan is an example of the dynamic nature of the mediation relationship.
The employee believed he was in mediation. The attorney did not. The opinion
does not disclose the specific nature of the proceedings at issue, but it leaves the
impression that only the attorney and the employee were present. Certainly, this
is not the typical conception of mediation. The mediation at issue may have
consisted of several telephone calls and one or two face-to-face negotiations. Such
proceedings are not typical of mediation, but it is unclear why they do not merit
the same protection as more traditional mediation. The Heelan case also shows
how mediation is viewed from both a subjective and an objective vantage. The
key issue is whether the parties are attempting to settle their differences. All other
requirements may be merely procedural obstacles depriving deserving proceedings
of statutory confidentiality. 2 1
The flexible character of mediation makes the adoption of bright line rules
a difficult task. Some legislatures may choose to settle the issue by requiring
signed agreements and approved programs staffed by trained mediators before the
proceedings will be considered privileged. While such an approach has the
advantage of ease of application, it may undermine the effectiveness of mediation.
Such could result in the demise of informal programs staffed with volunteer
mediators. It is far from clear, however, that private, informal mediation is less
deserving of the state's blessing than more formal programs. Confidentiality
statutes should protect programs which merit protection by the contribution they
make to the larger goals of the society. To the extent that groundless definitional
requirements promote form over substance, mediation will become less effective
and more bureaucratic-more like courts of law. 2
VI. DEFINING THE LIMITS OF PROTECrION
In jurisdictions where a statute protects the confidentiality of mediated
proceedings, the courts are forced to construe the coverage of the applicable
statute. The typical statute affords protection for all communications and
disclosures made during a mediation, so long as they are relevant to the topic of
the mediation. 2 3 In addition to defining the type of proceedings covered by the
statute, courts must define other parameters of coverage. Likely issues include:
(1) whether the statute covers discussions as to why and if the mediation should
be undertaken; (2) what constitutes a "communication" or "disclosure"; (3) whether
proceedings between the parties without the mediator present are protected; (4)
whether discussions between one party and the mediator without the other party

200.
201.
202.
203.

Id.
See generally Green, supra note 41, at 2, 30; Cf MEDIATION, supra note 1, at 48.
Cf MEDIATION, supra note 1, at 48.
See Murphy, supra note 10, at 222-23.
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present are protected; and (5) (likely the most problematic) was the communication
relevant to the topic of the mediation.
Newark Board of Education v. Newark Teachers Union2'4 is an example
of how a court may circumvent a confidentiality statute to obtain relevant
evidence. The board of education and the teacher's group engaged in labor
mediation under a rule which provided that information disclosed by a party to a
mediator in the performance of his duties would not be divulged voluntarily or by
compulsion. 20 The rule also made the mediator's files and records
confidential,
2
as well as any papers received by the mediator from the parties. M
At trial the school board sought production of union counter-proposals and
notes taken by the union's representative during the mediation." 7 The
documents sought were produced at the mediation for settlement purposes. 2 a
The union representative gave these documents to the mediator for transmittal to
the school board representative. 2 9 The court held that the confidentiality
provisions of the rule did not include the documents because the mediator did not
read the documents. 210 It reasoned that the rule's purpose is to preserve the
mediator's appearance of impartiality rather than the confidentiality of the
mediation proceedings. 21' Consequently, access to material which the mediator
merely delivered from one party to another was not covered by the rule.212
In Krueger v. Washington Federal Savings Bank,2 1 1 the Minnesota Court
of Appeals decided whether a state confidentiality statute 214 extended protection
to discussions as to why a. mediation should take place. Krueger was a farmer.2 15 The state statute gave farmers the right to request mediation before a
lender instituted foreclosure proceedings.2 6 The mediation was voluntary but
required the lender to attend at least one session.217 Krueger requested mediation and the lender attended the required meeting.28 No accord was reached and
the foreclosure was instituted.21 9 When a second lender threatened foreclosure,
Krueger requested mediation with the second lender and sought an injunction to
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Id. at 61, 377 A.2d at 770.
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force the first lender to attend as well. "0 The first lender refused and subpoenaed the mediator to testify about the earlier discussions and as to why the first
mediation was undertaken, presumably to demonstrate the pointlessness of a
second mediation. " The trial court quashed the subpoena on the mediator's
unopposed motion, but the court of appeals reversed, holding that any privilege
which might exist did not prevent access to discussions as to why the mediation
should take place.'
In N.L.R.B. v. Joseph Macaluso, Incm the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
decided that a mediator's testimony concerning whether both parties actually
agreed on a settlement could not be compelled. The union claimed that an
agreement was reached during mediation while the employer claimed otherwise." The trial court initially granted a subpoena for the mediator to testify
as to what actually happened, but later revoked it holding that testifying would
"
undermine the mediator's credibility as a neutral in future mediations. m
The
Ninth Circuit affirmed.n6 It noted as a primary consideration, the effect on the
mediator's status as a neutral party. "7 Confidentiality was only a means
to an
2
end-preserving the effectiveness of the mediator for future disputes. 78
Macaluso raises an interesting paradox. The purpose of mediation is to
promote settlement. 22 Confidentiality is necessary for the mediation process to
achieve binding settlements.2 ° In this case, assuming a settlement was actually
reached, the need for confidentiality prevents access to the mediator's testimony.
But, the mediator's testimony was vital to enforcing the settlement which was the
ultimate goal of the mediation. One of the greatest challenges facing drafters of
confidentiality legislation is to strike a balance between the need for confidentiality
and the need to enforce settlements.
Many confidentiality statutes simply state that all communications made
during a mediation will be inadmissible.2 t Such blanket grants of privilege will
seem especially harsh if one party claims that the settlement reached was the result
of fraud and attempts to introduce evidence from the mediation as proof of the
fraud. If enforced as written, such statutes seem to immunize fraudulent conduct.
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231. See, e.g., ME. R. EVID. 408(b) ('Evidence of conduct or statements by any party or mediator

at a court-sponsored domestic relations session is not admissible for any purpose.").

Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1991

25

Journal of Dispute Resolution, Vol. 1991, Iss. 2 [1991], Art. 3
JOURNAL OF DISPUTE RESOLUTION

[Vol. 1991, No. 2

In Harrimanv. Maddocks, 2 the court held such a blanket statute did not
bar insureds from introducing evidence that an adjuster had fraudulently induced
The adjuster
them to sign a release shortly after an automobile accident.3
claimed that the confidentiality statute barred introduction of such evidence.'
Maine Rules of Evidence 408 substantially tracks Federal Rule of Evidence 408,
and adds: "Evidence of conduct or statements by any party or mediator at a courtsponsored domestic relations session is not admissible for any purpose." 5 The
court summarily rejected the argument that the rule barred evidence of fraudulent
inducement, holding that the rule barred admission of settlement negotiations only
when offered to prove liability.2
E. J. Wilson v. Attaway," 7 exemplifies the greatest challenge to confidentiality statutes. Plaintiff was arrested as a result of an altercation during a mediation
session. -m Plaintiff then filed a civil suit against the other participant alleging
that the arrest violated his constitutional rights. 9 The mediator witnessed the
altercation which formed the basis of the criminal charge and made reference to
the incident in his report."0 The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals held that it
was not an abuse of discretion to refuse admission of the report into evidence at
trial.24' The court reasoned that the statute setting up the mediation service
which conducted the mediation provided for confidentiality and to allow the
mediator's report to be used against one of the parties would undermine the
mediation process. 2
In re Waller24 3 further illustrates the complexities courts are likely to
encounter when deciding issues of standing and coverage. The court avoided
deciding whether an attorney representing a client in a mediation could assert the
privilege in disciplinary proceedings against him for ethical violations allegedly
committed during the mediation. 2"
The original action concerned a medical malpractice suit filed against several
health care providers. 245 The court ordered mediation and further ordered that
"no statements by parties or counsel shall be disclosed or admissible." 2' During
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the course of the mediation the mediator revealed to the plaintiff's attorney that
the surgeon who actually operated on plaintiff was not named as a defendant."7
Plaintiff's attorney explained that the surgeon was not named because he was a
client of the attorney.'
The mediator then told the attorney that this was a
conflict of interest and that the attorney should inform the judge. 9 The
attorney maintained that there was no conflict and refused to tell the judge.21°
After several unsuccessful attempts to convince the attorney to disclose the
relevant facts to the judge, the mediator decided that the matter was not
confidential under the judge's order because it was not related to the mediation
and informed the judge of the relevant facts. 251
When asked by the trial judge to explain the matter, the attorney initially
maintained, that the entire matter was his way of testing the confidentiality of the
mediation. 2 The trial judge referred the matter to the bar committee. 5 3 The
committee disciplined the attorney for the misrepresentation during the mediation.' The matter was appealed to the State Board on Professional Responsibility which reversed the committee's findings."
It avoided the confidentiality
issue by disciplining the attorney for his admittedly false statement to the trial
court that he was simply testing the integrity of the mediator.52 The matter was
then appealed to the District of Columbia Court of Appeals. The court affirmed
the Board's decision without addressing the issue of whether the attorney could
claim the privilege to prevent discipline for statements made during the mediation. " 7
Waller reveals the willingness of a court to allow circumvention of the plain
language when it perceives a miscarriage of the drafters' intent. The statement to
the court which ultimately resulted in Waller's discipline was prompted by the
court's inquiry into, arguably, confidential proceedings. Yet neither the State
Board nor the court of appeals felt it necessary to determine the issue of whether
the in court statements were the result of an impermissible inquiry. Acting in
reliance on a clear court order, an attorney frankly disclosed information to a
mediator which later led to his discipline. Ironically, this case suggests that
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participants might be well advised to test the confidentiality of the mediator before
disclosing important facts."
VII. IMPLICATIONS
No mediator can tell a client with complete confidence that everything said
during the course of the mediation will remain confidential in all circumstances.
Topicality requirements or definitional technicalities pose serious threats to
absolute confidentiality, even in states with blanket confidentiality statutes. It is
very likely that there are mediators practicing today who know that and still
induce their clients to disclose embarrassing and potentially damaging information
with promises of confidentiality. Such mediators should realize that they incur a
duty on such promises and may find themselves defending suits for breach of
contract, invasion of privacy, or fraud. If the mediator is paid, such fraudulent
misrepresentations could even trigger criminal sanctions. 9
Mediation is communication. It often requires disclosure of embarrassing and
potentially damaging information. Such self-disclosure is a very threatening
process for most people. It requires a willingness to assume the risk of rejection
and abuse, but it is absolutely necessary to the proper functioning of the mediation
process. Mediation is built on trust.26° Without trust participants will not
disclose their true needs. But before participants can trust each other they must
trust the mediator. If mediators are to be trusted they must be truthful. Frankly
informing parties to a mediation of the limitations to confidentiality may in the
short run discourage some disclosures and hence reduce effectiveness. In the long
run, however, it is the only viable solution.
KENT L. BROWN

258. In two other cases the courts have avoided difficult decisions respecting confidentiality of
mediated statements by resolving the cases on procedural grounds. In Oster v. Oster, the trial court
made a child custody award on evidence disclosed in a mediation. The Court of Appeals reversed the
case as not firal without commenting on the confidentiality issue. Oster, 536 So. 2d 835,836 (La. Ct.
App. 1988). In Columbia Management Co. v. Wyss, the court held that admitting evidence of the
amount one party told a third party neutral he would take to settle the case in a settlement negotiation
was harmless error if it was error at all. 94 Or. App. 195, 206, 765 P.2d 207, 215 (1988).
259. For a discussion of specific causes of action available against mediators see generally
Chaykin, supra note 92, at 53-77.
260. Cf. Chaykin, supra note 16 at, 74445.
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